What if one of the biggest forces shaping the Gulf’s eventual post-war order is not American power, Iranian influence or a new regional alliance — but the Gulf’s own economic interests?
The war that began with joint US-Israeli strikes on Iran on February 28 is now in its seventh month. Iran responded with missile and drone attacks across Gulf states, often saying it was targeting US military facilities, while strikes and debris also damaged civilian and economic infrastructure. Yet the Gulf response offers an important clue about how regional strategy may be changing.
Restraint under pressure
The scale of the attacks has been substantial. In March, Iranian strikes damaged Qatar’s Ras Laffan industrial complex, a critical centre for its LNG industry. The UAE said that 2,819 ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones were launched towards its territory during the first 40 days of the conflict.
But the GCC’s collective posture combined condemnation and defensive measures with repeated calls for de-escalation. In June, GCC Secretary-General Jasem Albudaiwi said member states had deliberately exercised restraint to avoid a wider cycle of escalation. Qatar similarly stressed a unified Gulf preference for ending the war, while Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman later urged renewed dialogue and a diplomatic path towards a truce.
This is not simply a diplomatic preference. It reflects the Gulf’s growing economic stake in regional stability.
What the Gulf is trying to protect
Over the past decade, diversification has moved to the centre of Gulf economic planning. Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, We the UAE 2031, Oman Vision 2040 and Qatar National Vision 2030 all place varying emphasis on non-oil growth, investment, tourism, trade, logistics and private-sector development.
Those ambitions depend on movement. Investors need predictability. Energy must reach foreign markets. Ships must move through regional waterways and tourists and business travellers must be able to fly through Gulf aviation hubs.
The war has demonstrated how quickly conflict can expose those vulnerabilities.
The World Travel & Tourism Council estimated in March that disruption was affecting international visitor spending across the Middle East by at least $600 million per day. More than 3,400 flights were cancelled across major regional airports during the first 24 hours of severe disruption.
Energy has proved even more exposed. Six months into the war, Reuters estimated that Qatar’s LNG exports had fallen 96% compared with the same period a year earlier, costing the country about $24 billion in gas sales.
The problem is not only immediate financial damage. It is the uncertainty that prolonged conflict introduces into investment decisions, logistics networks, insurance costs, aviation and energy exports.
From détente to managed rivalry
This economic vulnerability may create a stronger incentive for managed rivalry with Iran.
That does not mean Gulf governments no longer see Iran as a security challenge, nor does it imply an abandonment of their security relationships with the United States. Rather, it suggests a distinction between deterrence and permanent confrontation.
The distinction existed before the war. Saudi Arabia and Iran restored diplomatic relations through Chinese mediation in 2023. The UAE had already returned its ambassador to Tehran in 2022, while Kuwait appointed its first ambassador there in more than six years the same year.
The war has badly damaged that process, but it has not completely eliminated diplomatic contact. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman all sent representatives to Ali Khamenei’s funeral in July. Gulf states and Iran were also preparing talks in Oman over the future of the Strait of Hormuz before the meeting was postponed amid renewed tensions in September.
That postponement is also a warning: economic incentives can encourage diplomacy, but they cannot by themselves overcome security conflicts.
Economics and the new security calculus
The Gulf’s economic transformation therefore creates a strategic dilemma. Strong defence remains central to protecting states and infrastructure, yet repeated confrontation can threaten many of the same economic assets that Gulf security policies are designed to protect.
The real question is whether deterrence and diplomatic engagement can coexist sufficiently to contain rivalry without pretending that the rivalry has disappeared.
If so, Gulf economic ambitions may become an increasingly important influence on regional security decisions. The logic would not be reconciliation with Iran at any cost, but something more limited: preventing competition from repeatedly turning into conflicts that disrupt trade, energy, aviation and investment.
In that sense, the Gulf’s future security calculations may increasingly be shaped not only by the threats its governments face, but by what they have built — and what prolonged instability could put at risk.
Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect The Arabinform Journal point of view.
MPhil scholar in Strategic Studies at the National Defence University, Islamabad. Her research interests include geopolitics, geo-economics, strategic technologies, regional security and international affairs. She has also been associated with the Institute for Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis (ISSRA) at NDU
